Thursday, February 21, 2013

Not My Topic

U.S. gun laws are not my first choice for a blog topic, because I don't have a passionate view on the issue. Of course I recognize that there is a big problem in the U.S., and I am not without concern about it, I just haven't heard a proposed solution that would be both effective and politically practical. I don't have a solution either. What I do have is a low tolerance for ridiculous arguments, especially those that spread through social media.
Those inflammatory graphics with a line or two of text may be great for stirring indignation, fear, and anger, but they aren't going to get us any closer to a meaningful understanding of the situation, let alone a solution.
This topic is too long for a single blog post, so I'll have to address one facet per post until I run out of steam or get distracted by another subject. I'll start with

Operation Fast and Furious

This one baffles me the most, for reasons I'll detail later. Let's start with a summary of the operation as one would understand it by reading Facebook posts.
In 2009, President Obama and Secretary Holder directed the ATF to supply Mexican drug cartels with U.S. weapons for reasons unknown, but probably to precipitate violence and justify a U.S. crackdown on gun laws.
Every part of this is wrong.
Without a doubt, the gunwalking schemes were a nightmare of bureaucratic bungling and mismanagement. But we aren't going to fix a problem by spinning fairy tales about how the problem started and what happened. A little historical perspective is in order.
The problem starts with Mexican vs. U.S. gun laws. Mexican citizens can keep guns in their homes. It is a difficult process to obtain them, but it can be done legally. It is impossible to acquire a large arsenal of assault weapons quickly and legally.
The situation is a little different in the U.S.
Obviously, Mexican drug lords can not drive north and drop into a U.S. gun shop to buy a truckload of AR-15s. What they can and did do was find U.S. citizens willing to buy weapons and sell them for a handsome profit. These gun suppliers in turn would set up dozens of "straw buyers", citizens who would make regular legitimate purchases in gun shops. None of this was coordinated by the drug lords, the network grew organically, fertilized by dollars.
The U.S. ATF was aware of the problem at its earliest. Their answer was to receive tips from licensed firearm dealers about suspicious purchases, track the buyers to the houses where arsenals were being collected, and make arrests.
The guns continued to flow. The arrests made by the ATF had no real impact on the larger network, and the bureau came under increasing political pressure to get at the kingpins of the operation, and ultimately at the drug cartels themselves.
The first gunwalking operation with the intention of tracking all the way to drug cartels was called Operation Wide Receiver, and lasted from 2006 - 2008. Briefly, the idea was to continue tracking straw purchases to gun houses, but not make arrests there. Instead, they would allow the guns to continue to move under surveillance as they went up the chain and eventually across the border. Information would be passed to Mexican authorities, who would continue the tracking there.
Operation Wide Receiver was a general failure, and there was no shortage of blame thrown about in the aftermath. There were definite communication failures between the various parties, but analyzing the breakdown is not relevant here.
Various smaller probes were conducted in various states and offices, the total number is not publicly known.
In 2009, new federal mandates to interdict cartel gun suppliers came down the chain. Operation Fast and Furious was designed by supervisors at the Phoenix ATF office in response to the new mandate. Gunwalking was chosen by the Phoenix office as the most practical way to accomplish the task.
Controversy about the operation began early and within the bureau itself, with plenty of disagreement among officials about conduct and tactics. Agents who wanted to make arrests were opposed by officials who wanted to continue tracking and by prosecutors who believed they did not have a strong case. Newer technology tracking systems proved inadequate, and communication between departments was almost nil.
Picking apart the failure is not productive or relevant here. The more important points are:
  • The U.S. Government did not supply guns to Mexican drug cartels. Guns have been flowing and continue to flow to Mexico by illegal gun traders. The gunwalking programs were a failed attempt to track down the larger gun trade network.
  • Neither the Bush nor the Obama administration conceived the gunwalking programs. The extent to which they were aware of them is a matter of pointless debate, since the programs were modeled on standard tactics used in drug interdiction. The concept was arguably sound, but the execution was abysmal.
  • Operation Fast and Furious was not the first gunwalking program, nor was it the first failure.
Now on to the part I find most puzzling. The posts I've run across that are critical of Operation Fast and Furious are invariably shared by the same persons who are most opposed to tighter gun laws. The illegal U.S. - Mexican gun trade is a product of U.S. availability of guns coupled with drug cartel demand. Our government's first response was tighter scrutiny of gun sales, profiling purchases, and arresting suspicious buyers. Under the gunwalking operations, those controls were deliberately loosened in order to find the cartel buyers.
For those who are opposed to our government monitoring and regulating gun sales, Operation Fast and Furious should not be something to draw attention to. But perhaps that is why they often misrepresent what it was.